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the book was part of a seminar on constitutional law. The reader. however. is not in the 
seminar. The patchwork and unevenness of the book is not up to Professor Tribe's usual 
standards of scholarship. 
To conclude, I applaud Professor Tribe for addressing the abortion issue. The debate 
needs this learned voice and reasoned temperament. I think he has put his pen on the current 
impasse - values have been absolutized and public discourse has been gridlocked . Professor 
Tribe's latest book is an attempt to break the gridlock and advance the public debate about 
this crucial issue. It can only be hoped that others will work out a better way to resolve the 
clash of absolutes . However, Professor Tribe has helped us all to see the issues more clearly. 
And in this highly charged area of debate, this is no small achievement. 
- William F. Maestri 
St. Joseph Seminary College 
St. Benedict, La. 
Life and Death Decision-Making 
Baruch Brody 
New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, xiix250pp 
One expects a high standard of performance from Baruch Brody, and this book does not 
disappoint. Brody is a professor of philosophy at Rice University and professor of 
biomedical ethics at the Baylor College of Medicine, both in Houston. His work displays 
traces of each, a combination of philosophical acumen with attention to clinical detail. In his 
preface Brody stresses the importance of avoiding the twin shortcomings of standard clinical 
thinking without attention to relevant moral theory, and abstract philosophical theory 
without attention to practical application. Brody succeeds in bringing together a discussion 
of the nuances of clinical settings with the use of abstract ethical principles. 
The book contains seven chapters; the first four are more theoretical , the last three more 
practical. Although the book has considerable merit throughout, by far the best part is the 
last three chapters which contain very careful discussions of real cases and exhibit the use of 
ethical principles for thinking about the moral responsibilities of the patient , family , and care 
givers. 
Chapter One is entitled, "The Need for a Moral Theory" and severely criticizes the view 
that sound moral thinking about specific cases can get along without a general moral theory. 
Decent motivations, a desire to do the right thing, says Brody, are not enough, and he 
presents several examples to illustrate the point that our thinking must be guided by the 
application of relevant moral principle if our desire to do the right thing stands a hope of 
being translated into act. 
In this chapter, Brody first mentions his preferred moral theory, which he calls the"Model 
of Conflicting Moral Appeals ." According to Brody, there are a number of different morally 
important principles that we ought to use in deciding how to act. Brody views these 
principles as independent of one another, in that the cogency of anyone of them cannot be 
reduced to or founded on the cognency of any of the others. Brody things that someday we 
may be able to develop a unified theory that will systematize these independent and 
sometimes discordant principles , but he believes that we now are far from possessing one. In 
its absence, our best option is to hold that the morally right decision is the decision that most 
completely respects whatever moral appeals are relevant to the case at hand. 
Chapter Two is important , for in it Brody lists and discusses the five different kinds of 
moral appeal that form the bedrock of his system. These are the appeals to (I) consequences 
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(which include promoting good, avoiding harm, and removing evil) , (2) rights, (3) respect for 
persons, (4) virtuous action (particularly the virtues of integrity, compassion, courage, and 
honesty), and (5) justice and fairness, Brody believes that the shortcomings of other ethical 
theories can be traced to their tendency to focus on only one or two of these competing moral 
appeals to the wrongful disregard of the others. Brody thinks that the strength of his theory 
rests on its being "pluralistic." Perhaps "comprehensive" would be more apt here. Brody 
certainly intends to reject the common relativism that would leave moral thinking in the 
desperate condition of noting simply that what is right according to my principles is wrong 
according to yours. 
Chapter Three contains Brody's criticisms of two competing models of moral analysis for 
biomedicine. The first of these he calls "the Contractual Model ," which sees all moral issues 
as resolvable by appeal to the explicit or implicit terms of the agreement between patient and 
provider of health care. The second he calls "the Status Model ," which would reduce all 
moral analysis to the social roles of patient and health care provider. Brody's criticisms of 
both are that they are insufficiently "pluralistic", that each model by its very nature is blind to 
certain relevant moral appeals. The Contractual Model, for instance, tends to ignore certain 
aspects of the right to treatment, the virtues of integrity and compassion, respect for persons, 
and attention to consequences. Brody brings similar charges against the Status Model, and 
his criticisms of both are in the main devastating. 
Chapter Four, along with Chapter Two, provides the theoretical heart of Brody's work. In 
it he offers most helpful advice about how to weigh the seriousness of competing moral 
claims. 
In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, Brody deals with specific cases from his own clinical 
experience in order to show the relevance of the competing appeals presented in Chapter 
Two. Chapter Five deals with competent adults, some of whom wish to be treated and some 
of whom do not. Chapter Six covers cases of incompetent adults, some without families , 
some with families who wish treatment, some with families who do not wish treatment. And 
Chapter Seven examines cases of children, some newborns with parents who wish treatment, 
some newborns with parents who do not wish treatment, some adolescent or teenage 
children. 
Each case is extremely well argued. Brody examines the plausible options, considers 
reasons favoring and opposing them, and offers his own conclusions. His views are 
presented in a non-emotional manner. But he compels the reader to enter into the analysis 
and to reflect on the nature of the conflicting moral appeals present in the individual case. 
The reader who disagrees with Brody's conclusions finds himself forced to argue on Brody's 
own terms. Brody does such a good job of showing the worth and relevance of the different 
moral appeals, that no one who attends carefully to Brody's presentation can ignore the 
power of his analysis. 
Brody's own conclusions will be found acceptable by most adherents of traditional 
morality. That is to say, Brody avoids the twin dangers of treat-at-any-cost vitalism on the 
one hand, and the abandonment of "useless eaters" on the other. Brody is a clear, 
unemotional, and incisive analytic thinker. He also possesses genuine humanity and 
wisdom. 
But the book has two serious theoretical shortcomings. The first of these Brody takes to be 
a strength - that the five sometimes competing moral appeals are all equally fundamental 
and irreducible to one another. Our moral theory may not be in the best of shape, but it is not 
. quite the hodgepodge Brody makes it out to be. Most importantly, Brody believes that the 
twin appeals to rights and to respect for persons are not reducible to one another. Thus, 
although the right to life is possessed by all living members of the human species (and 
abortion is therefore morally wrong), not all members of the human species are equally 
deserving of respect because not all members of the human species are equally capable offree 
choice. 
The mutual irreducibility of rights and respect for persons generates considerable oddity. 
On the one hand, it is morally wrong to kill an irreversibly comatose patient not because 
respect is owed him as a person (the power of free choice has been lost forever) but because 
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his right to life would be violated. On the other hand . it is morally wrong to assist a patient's 
suicide not because his right to life would thus be violated (the patient could waive the right) 
but because to do so is to fail to respect him as a person. 
All rights. according to Brody, can be waived. The notion of an "inalienable" right , a right 
that cannot be alienated or waived , is nonsense in Brody's view, as though "rights are 
burdens with which we are stuck" (p. 22). Brody fails to attend to the fact that the status of 
personhood can at times appear to be "a burden with which we are stuck," if, for instance, it 
prevents us from suicide when we are in intractable pain . Why we can be stuck with the 
burden of personhood but not with that of rights is a question to which Brody offers no 
answer. Nor does he even think to raise the question of where rights come from except to say 
that "rights are relationships between people which exist as correlatives of obligations." But 
about what constitutes the grounds of obligations Brody apparently has no idea. 
Second. Brody lacks the conceptual tools for analyzing the concept of action because he 
fails to understand the role of intentions. This does not lead him into practica l moral error 
rega rding his conclusions about the specific cases he treats. But it does mean that for all the 
book's strengths, it provides an inadequate theoretical guide for confidence in dealing with 
the thorniest practical difficulties. 
The ultimate inadequacy of Brody's analysis can be most easily seen in his explication of 
the right to life. Part (but only part) of the right to life is the right not to be killed , which 
Brod y defines as follows. "X has a right not to be killed against everyone since everyone has 
an obligation not to deprive X of X's life (where that means not to cause the loss of X's life)" 
(p.24). 
This will not do , and it is essential to see why it will not do . In Brody's view, if the Soviets 
were to place East German infants on the turrets of their tanks and send them through the 
Fulda Gap, NATO could do nothing to stop the tanks, at least if we assume with Brody that 
the infants possess the right not to be killed (as part of the right to life) and that the right to 
life is a fundamental right that may not be violated. To shoot at the tanks would ce rtainly be 
to cause the loss of the children's lives, and so would violate their right not to be killed and so 
would violate their right to life . One alternative (not Brod y's) is to admit that shooting at the 
tanks would be to violate the children's right to life . but that sometimes violation of the right 
to life can be justified under conditions of extreme necessity. But that way madness (and the 
gas chamber) lies. 
Brody confuses the causal act of killing with the moral act of intended killing , The right 
not to be killed is (among other things) not the right not to have one's death caused but the 
right not to have one's death sought. Reckless disregard of or indifference to another 
person's life is also wrong, but the absolute prohibition cannot be interpreted to apply to the 
sheer causing of death , as the illustration shows. 
The theoretical weakness of Brody's position could be ignored by readers of this journal if 
it had implications only for matters of warfare. But inadequacies in the very foundations of a 
theory are almost certain to displa y themselves in a systematic fashion throughout the 
vario us fields of application. and this is true in Brody's case. 
Consider how Brody distinguishes active from passive euthanasia. "Active euthanasia is 
causing the death of the patient. Passive euthanasia is allowing the patient's disease processes 
to kill the patient without intervening to prevent that from happening" (p . 120). Again , we 
see Brody attempting to build his analysis on what is caused and not on what is sought. 
Wo uld tha deministering of a large dose of morphine be ac tive euthanasia if death is caused 
but not so ught? Would failure to turn on the heat in a room so that the patient might contract 
pneumonia and so die be passive euthanasia but not active? It is both theoretically and 
practically superior to define the act of euthanasia by what is intended (death), and leave the 
issue of what is caused as a possible side effect to be assessed using the principle of 
proportionality. 
An article which can be used to explain the defective character of both features of Brody's 
theoretical presentation is a work with which everyone in the field of health care ought to be 
thoroughly familiar. It is by Richard Stith, entitled "Toward Freedom from Value," was 
orig inally published in Thr Jurisl (1978), a nd has been republished in several anthologies. 
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It is as important an article as exists in the field of biomedicine. It explains what is involved in 
the notion of respect for persons. and defends as one of the paramount principles in 
biomedicine (or any other field) - "Do not act . or fail to act . in order that the patient [or any 
innocent human] might die ." 
Brody's book has much to recommend it. This reviewer could not advise anything more 
helpful for clinical medicine than Brody's work supplemented by Stith's article. 
-Gary Atkinson 
Professor of Philosophy 
College of St. Thomas 
St. Paul, MN 
The Homosexual Person: 
New Thinking in Pastoral Care 
John F, Harvey, O.S.F.S. 
Ignatius Press. San Francisco, 249 pp. 
For the average citizen, homosexuality is a condition poorly understood, repellent, and 
confusing. For this reason, it is essential that this recently published book by Father Harvey 
be widely read by physicians, nurses, medically oriented persons , and religious. Laymen 
interested in this problem will also gain deep insights into the many individuals afflicted with 
this disorder. 
John Harvey is a moral theologian and psychologist who has devoted more than 34 years 
to studying, researching and counseling. He brings deep insight to this field of 
homosexuality. 
In this book , Father Harvey grounds his observations on the sound foundation of the 
magisterial teaching of the Catholic Church and integrates medical, psychological and 
psychiatric research into the various chapters. 
In the first chapter, he discusses at length the definitions of homosexuality and the 
distinctions between homosexual activity and orientation, compulsive and non~ompulsive 
activity . In Chapter 2, he reviews the more recent theories concerning the origins of 
homosexuality. In Chapter 5, he deals with the major dissenting theological views of Charles 
Curran, Philip Keane , John McNeil and Gregory Baum. Following up on this is an excellent 
section elucidating the argument from revelation and reason in favor ofthe official teaching 
of the Church. 
Chapter 7 is, perhaps, the most practical section of this book, as Harvey presents pastoral 
perspectives and programs for those afflicted by this disorder. This chapter describes 
one-to-one counseling and its relationship to group therapy and group spiritual direction. 
This is an especially strong chapter. It gives hope to all that they can lead deep spiritual, 
chaste lives. Relying heavily on spiritual and psychological counseling, following the 12 steps 
of Alcoholics Anonymous, many homosexuals have been freed from the tyranny of their 
own condition and gone on to live chaste and integrated lives. For special criticism, Harvey 
points out the deficiencies of Dignity and New Ways Ministry, organizations of dissenting 
Catholics. 
In Chapter 8, he deals with the problems of the married homosexual , the apparent 
ado lescent homosexual and AIDS. His ninth chapter is devoted to psychological and 
pastoral reflections on pedophilia and its treatment, along with the ethical aspects of the 
trea tment. The final chapter is a capsule summary of the entire book in which he succinctly 
states his conclusions. 
February, 1991 89 
